How well do immigrants entering the UK assimilate into recipient labour markets? Using the underexploited, sizeable and long Lifetime Labour Market Database between 1981 and 2006, we investigate the evolution of the immigrant-native earnings gap-a measure of immigrants' assimilation-across the entire earnings distribution, across cohorts and across nationalities. We are able to control for observable and unobservable individual-specific characteristics as well as for specific characteristics of both time periods and recipient labour markets, defined as small geographical areas, and crucially, for the interaction of the two, in a robust empirical model specification anchored in the human capital theory. We also control for cohort-specific effects and nationality-specific effects. Our results show little evidence of large or persistent earnings disparities across the earnings distribution, across cohorts or across nationalities. These findings are supportive evidence of successful assimilation of immigrants into the UK, suggesting that recipient labour markets primarily reward individuals' characteristics other than, and regardless of, their immigration status. Nevertheless, some distinctive features emerge. When investigating the evolution of the immigrant-native earnings gap over time, our results illustrate how immigrants from different continents and cohorts have very different assimilation trajectories.
Introduction
The UK has experienced a substantial increase in immigration inflows in the last two decades (Goodhart, 2010) , reinvigorating the immigration debate among scholars and policy makers. In this context, it has often been suggested that low-skilled immigrants face disadvantages in the labour market (Wadsworth, 2003) . More recent research, however, has suggested that this evidence is not straightforward and that immigrants may experience different degrees and trends of assimilation not only because of skill interaction of the two. Neither does it account for cohort-specific characteristics, such as nationality composition and skill composition, among others. 1 Our main contribution is to address each of these three issues. We estimate a key measure of immigrants' assimilation-the immigrant-native earnings gap-controlling for observable and unobservable individual fixed effects, as well as for both time and recipient labour market fixed effects, and crucially, for the interaction of the two in a robust empirical model specification anchored in the human capital theory. We also control for cohort-specific effects and nationality-specific effects. This way we separately control for the role of each of these dimensions on immigrants' assimilation.
We use data from the Lifetime Labour Market Database (LLMDB), an underexploited, sizeable and long longitudinal data set that has seldom been used for immigration analysis. It combines anonymised tax and social security records into a data set that tracks a random sample of more than 600,000 individuals between 1981 and 2006, providing a range of geo-referenced data on individual characteristics.
Indeed, our contribution is timely. Accounting for each of these dimensions, using such an underexploited, rich, sizeable and long longitudinal data set, is paramount in explaining the immigrant-native earnings gap. Despite that, and to the best of our knowledge, no estimation of the gap accounting for all these dimensions, exploiting a long sample period and defining recipient labour markets as small geographical areas consistently over time, is available in the literature. Such estimation would be unfeasible utilising data sets more commonly used in the literature for UK immigration research, such as the General Household Survey and the Labour Force Survey. This is because these data sets neither follow individuals over a long period, nor have a large enough sample size to permit fine levels of disaggregation across small geographical areas (below the regional level) consistently over time.
We start by estimating the immigrant-native earnings gap across the entire earnings distribution. The earnings gap is a powerful, informative and direct indicator that attests to the successful integration of new labour resources into recipient labour markets. Estimating the gap not only at the average, but also across the entire distribution, enhances its informative power and provides an insightful investigation of emerging trends for different groups of immigrants that cluster at various points along the distribution. We then estimate the gap controlling for cohort of arrival and for continent of nationality. This provides further insights into how the gap is affected by immigrants' origins as well as by changing economic conditions and attitudes to immigration.
Our results show that the immigrant-native earnings gap substantially narrows down when individual observable and unobservable characteristics as well as time period and recipient labour market characteristics, and their interaction, are controlled for. The individual characteristics dimension seems to be preponderant in explaining most of the gap. These findings support the evidence of successful assimilation of immigrants into the UK, suggesting that recipient labour markets primarily reward individuals' characteristics other than, and regardless of, their immigration status. Nevertheless, some distinctive features emerge. Immigrants entering the labour market at the bottom of the earnings distribution tend to have a less favourable assimilation experience. Also, immigrants entering the UK in earlier cohorts, such as in the post-war period, experienced faster assimilation, suggesting, possibly, a more positive attitude towards immigration associated with the role of immigrants in the post-war reconstruction effort. Earlier cohorts, such as the post-war cohorts, not only fare better than more recent ones at entry, but also the earnings of immigrants in such cohorts catch up faster with natives' earnings. Similarly, North Americans, Europeans and Australians fare better at entry, and their earnings catch up faster with natives' earnings. More generally, our results when investigating the evolution of the immigrant-native earnings gap over time illustrate how immigrants from different continents and cohorts have very different assimilation trajectories.
Data and descriptive statistics
We use data from the LLMDB, which is derived from a number of administrative data sets linked together through the National Insurance Number (NINo). Whereas natives are automatically given a NINo, immigrants typically apply for one when they start interacting with the system, either by paying taxes or by claiming benefits. ('Natives' and 'Immigrants' here and throughout the article are, respectively, referred to as UK and overseas nationals.) Because the NINo is a unique individual identifier, the LLMDB tracks individuals over their entire working lifetime.
The LLMDB is a long, sizeable and rich longitudinal data set. It comprises more than 600,000 individuals (a 1% random sample of NINo records) followed between the tax years 1981 and 2006. A fresh cohort of individuals enters the sample every year and is followed from then on. We restricted our sample to males aged 25-64 and females aged 25-59 years, as customary in the earnings gap literature, and to those with earnings between £100 and £1,000,000 in any one tax year (which runs from April to March). The self-employed, for whom we do not observe earnings, are excluded from the sample. 2 We also restricted our sample to immigrants arriving from 1945 onwards, because the number of immigrants arriving previously was relatively very low and because restricting the sample facilitates cohort modelling. We further restricted our sample to those observed at least twice to control for individual fixed effects (Section 3). Finally, we restricted our sample to those whose address in each time period is observed to control for area fixed effects.
3 Our final working sample therefore consists of 354,465 individuals, 38,074 of whom are immigrants, as shown in Table 1 .
The LLMDB contains date of birth, date of death, age, gender, address, nationality, country of origin (country of arrival immediately before NINo registration), immigrants' entry date, immigrants' age at entry, number of jobs in the year, annual earnings per job, type of employment (employee or self-employed), number of weeks employed and unemployed in the year, spells of unemployment, spells of receipt of benefits, benefit type, pension contributions, pension entitlements, etc. However, as is common in the case of administrative records, no information on educational attainment is provided. We circumvent this limitation to some extent both by restricting our sample to individuals in work aged at least 25 years and by controlling for individual fixed effects (Section 3). 4 As the LLMDB records information on address, it provides a range of geo-referenced data on individuals, which we then track across the whole sample period. Immigrants display a significant degree of geographic concentration in specific areas (Table 1) . As expected, immigrants cluster in London and in the South East, emphasising the role of labour market characteristics and multicultural environments in attracting immigrants-a well-known phenomenon in the literature. Note that the geographical distribution of natives and immigrants is remarkably similar in the LLMDB and the Labour Force Survey (LFS), which is the data set most widely used for UK immigration research . This geographical distribution pattern is fairly persistent over time; if anything, there is a slight upwards trend in the proportion of immigrants in London. This evidence reinforces the importance of accounting for recipient labour market characteristics when estimating the immigrantnative earnings gap (Section 3).
3 Our results were robust to interpolating missing addresses if the address in both the previous and subsequent tax year remained the same, which boosted our sample size. Given such robustness, however, we report the results without interpolation. Note that the LLMDB2 geographical distribution with our without interpolation remains remarkably similar to the one in the Labour Force Survey (LFS; see Table 1 and also see below). 4 By restricting our sample to those in work aged at least 25 years, who, we assume, have completed their education, we are assuming that education no longer varies over time and is just one more characteristic specific to the individual that we do not observe, such as race or ability. The standard literature accounts for such unobserved time invariant individual-specific characteristics by controlling for individual fixed effects. The standard argument is that, although we cannot identify the specific effect of say, race or ability, on wages, their effect is controlled for by the fixed effects in a manner that does not bias other coefficients. By assuming that education is a time invariant (fixed) characteristic, we extend this standard argument to education. Put differently, there is nothing particular about time-invariant completed education that makes it any less eligible than say, race or ability, to modelling via fixed effects. The main point is that we are not studying the effect of education on earnings, we are only accounting for it to prevent bias in other coefficients in our model (Section 3). Indeed, our results (Section 4) are qualitatively similar to other results in the literature where education was controlled for (Dustmann et al., 2013) . Incidentally, even when education is observed, the decision to include it in an immigrant-native earnings gap model such as ours is not straightforward. Although earnings models commonly include education, there is an unresolved debate in the immigration literature about the interpretation of other coefficients in the model when controlling for education (Borjas, 1999) . Excluding education implies that we are comparing the earnings of immigrants and natives, and not the earnings of immigrants and natives with the same education level. This is important because the extent and quality of education varies across countries. Immigrants and natives with the same education level may have different skills and compete for different jobs. For example, there is evidence that natives and immigrants are imperfect substitutes within education groups in the UK (Manacorda et al., 2007) . Also, immigrants across the education spectrum often suffer skill downgrading because of language or other labour market barriers (Card and DiNardo, 2000; Friedberg, 2001) . Table 1 shows that natives are more evenly spread across the country, are older than immigrants, earn more on average, are more likely to be employed and slightly less likely to be unemployed. Figure 1 shows the immigrant-native earnings gap across tax years, confirming that, on average, immigrants earned less than natives during most of the sample period, although the variation is large.
Interestingly, substantial heterogeneity emerges when we consider the gap across the earnings distribution. Table 1 shows that immigrants at the very bottom of the earnings distribution earn less than natives, whereas those at the very top earn more. This is confirmed in Figure 1 . While immigrants at the bottom of the distribution can earn less than a half of what their native counterparts earn, those at the top can earn up to a quarter more. The earnings gap for the lower-paid becomes more negative over time, especially after 2003, which coincides with the inflow of low-paid Eastern Europeans. In contrast, the earnings gap for the higher paid becomes more positive over time, especially around 2000, following the inflow of high-paid North Americans during the 1990s and 2000s, before it slopes down towards the end of the sample period. Table 1 shows that immigrants predominantly come from the European Union (EU), Asia and the Middle East and Africa. The composition of the inflows has changed over time, with a large share of EU immigrants (mainly Irish) and immigrants from former colonies (India, Pakistan, Bangladeshi, South Africa, Nigeria, etc.) being disproportionally represented during the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s, there was an increase in EU immigration after the UK joined the Union. During the 1980s and 1990s, there was a steady increase in inflows of immigrants from the EU, mainly because of the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal and an increase in the number of individuals coming from North America, Australasia and Oceania. In this period, immigration, mainly from Africa, Asia and the Middle East, also increased. Finally, there was a large inflow of EU immigrants in concomitance with 10 Eastern European countries (A10) joining the EU in the 2000s. 5 Figure 2 shows the immigrant--native earnings gap across tax years by continent of nationality. This is another way to see the earnings gap becoming more positive for North Americans during the late 1990s and early 2000s and more negative for Eastern Europeans after 2000. This evidence reinforces the importance of accounting for nationality and cohort characteristics when estimating the earnings gap (Section 3).
Note that the LLMDB records annual earnings (within the tax year)-i.e. total annual earnings including any part-time and/or unemployment spells-whereas the LFS records weekly earnings in a given week, which are extrapolated for the year ignoring any part-time and/or unemployment spells (which are unknown). As a result, the LFS figures in Table 1 overestimate earnings, which are higher for every percentile of the distribution. The difference is larger at the bottom and smaller at the top of the distribution, confirming that the LLMDB captures more low-paid workers (who either earn lower wages or work fewer hours). In particular, the LFS figures overestimate earnings for immigrants, who are more likely to be low-paid, and thus the gap between natives and immigrants is less (more) persistent in the LFS (LLMDB), with immigrants earning more than natives up to the 20th (50th) percentile of the distribution. However, although earnings are consistently lower in the LLMDB, the average earnings trend over time is similar. 6 Comparisons between the LLMDB and ASHE also show that annual earnings are lower in the LLMDB but that the trend of average earnings across both data sets is similar over time (Dickens and McKnight, 2008) .
Estimation strategy
Our descriptive statistics in Section 2 provide evidence of an unconditional immigrantnative earnings gap in the UK between 1981 and 2006. This gap is quite sizeable for some groups of immigrants, though it varies greatly across nationalities and across the earnings distribution. Our descriptive statistics also provide evidence of a distinctive pattern in the geographical distribution of immigrants. More importantly, our descriptive statistics provide suggestive evidence that some of the variability in the gap might be explained by the dynamic interaction of immigrants' geographical distribution, cohort of arrival, continent of nationality and position in the earnings distribution. As we argue in the Introduction, the interaction of each of these dimensions plays a role in explaining the gap. For example, whereas many of the highly skilled North Americans that arrived during the 1990s and 2000s ended up at the top of the earnings distribution and experience a more favourable gap, many of the Eastern Europeans that arrived in the 2000s ended up at the bottom of the distribution and experience a less favourable gap ( Figure 2) .
We now account for each of these dimensions by estimating the conditional immigrant-native earnings gap using a standard human capital model (Chiswick, 1980; . In the human capital model, individuals' earnings are a function of characteristics that influence individuals' productivity:
where E iat is log real earnings of individual i ¼ 1; :::; 354465 in area a ¼ 1; :::; 49 and time t ¼ 1981; :::; 2006; I i is an indicator variable that is 1 if the individual is an immigrant; X iat is a vector of observable individual characteristics including sex, age, age-squared, number of employed weeks in the year and number of jobs in the year; f i is individual-specific effects; f a is area-specific effects; f t is time-specific effects; f at is the interaction of area and time fixed effects; and " iat is the error term.
The ideal estimation approach here is to use the fixed effects model. Such approach is, however, unfeasible in the presence of a large number of parameters to be estimated.
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So it is first-difference transformation-a common variation of the fixed effects model when there are so many parameters-in the presence of dummy variables such as I i , which is, incidentally, our variable of interest. An alternative variation of the fixed effects model is Nakamura and Nakamura's (1985) inertia model, later re-worked by Chiswick et al. (2005) , where individual-specific effects are modelled as a function of lagged log real earnings, lagged number of employed weeks in the year X W iat and an error term x iat . Thus, instead of using individual dummies to model f i , we parameterise it as follows:
These two lagged variables together embed all the relevant information on unobservable individual characteristics that affects earnings, such as motivation, race, immigrant's age at arrival and ability. This is because these lagged variables capture individual-specific time invariant characteristics that have the same impact on earnings year after year. That is, these lagged variables account for characteristics and circumstances, specific to individuals, that affect earnings year after year, and these individual fixed effects are captured by a and b.
In sum, we control for unobservable individual fixed effects via lagged log real earnings and lagged number of employed weeks. Controlling for individual fixed effects enables us to separately account for the effect of individual-specific time invariant characteristics and circumstances on earnings. This way, we account for earnings differentials due, for example, to workers who are more motivated or who suffer more discrimination. Furthermore, by controlling for the lagged number of employed weeks in the year, we account for lower earnings for individuals with historically long spells of unemployment. Finally, by including these two lagged variables we also account for the effect of dynamics in the model and alleviate problems arising from serial correlation in the residuals. Controlling for individual fixed effects using a sufficiently large and long longitudinal data set, such as the LLMDB, is an important improvement on the existing UK immigrant-native earnings gap literature.
We model area fixed effects using county dummies. This way, we remove any permanent differences across counties and make them equally attractive to immigrants and natives. In other words, we control for specific factors in a county (such as more schools, more housing, lower prices and multiculturalism) that may make it more attractive to immigrants or natives or both. This enables us to separately account for the effect of county-specific time-invariant factors on earnings. Note that most available models in the immigrant-native earnings gap literature do not control for area fixed effects, except , where region fixed effects are included. Here, we model area fixed effects using 49 counties instead of 12 regions, which is a more flexible approach (Section 2). (We further relax this assumption in Section 4.4 and model area fixed effects using four other geographies, including Local Authorities (LAs) and Travel To Work Areas (TTWAs), and find remarkably robust results).
We model time fixed effects using tax year dummies. This way, we control for the effect of tax year-specific macroeconomic effects (such as seasonal shocks and national and international macroeconomic shocks) on earnings. This enables us to separately account for the effect of time-specific factors on earnings. Controlling for area and time fixed effects in this flexible manner (across counties and tax years) is an improvement on the existing UK earnings gap literature.
Finally, we control for observable individual characteristics such as sex, age, agesquared, number of employed weeks in the year and number of jobs in the year (Table 1 ). This enables us to separately account for the effect of such characteristics on earnings. For example, this way, we account for earnings differentials because of workers being younger or less experienced in addition to being immigrants. Although we do not observe experience, we control for age, which, albeit imperfectly, captures overall experience to a certain extent.
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This is a robust empirical specification that significantly improves over available specifications in the existing immigrant-native earnings gap literature. By controlling for individual observable and unobservable specific characteristics, area-specific characteristics, time-specific characteristics and the interaction of the last two, we largely prevent certain common selectivity biases. First, individual heterogeneity may introduce various types of biases in the model, such as ability bias, sorting bias and survivor bias (the long sample period and low levels of attrition in our data are particularly important to prevent survivor bias). Secondly, different cohorts of arrival can introduce bias such as cohort bias and return migration bias.
9 Thirdly, different levels of attractiveness across recipient labour markets can further introduce bias such as simultaneity bias (i.e. immigrants are more attracted to high-wage and lowunemployment areas). Fourthly, specific macroeconomic conditions as well as attitudes to immigration vary over time, and, if uncontrolled, can also introduce simultaneity bias in the model. Finally, we correct for intragroup serial correlation, as standard errors are assumed to be independent across groups of individuals but not within groups (i.e. for a particular individual over time). The interpretation of our coefficient of interest is that immigrants on average earn % more than natives. 
Results
Column 1 of Table 2 shows a negative and significant estimate for the immigrant-native earnings gap, controlling for -fixed effects, time-fixed effects and the interaction of the two. This estimate suggests that immigrants earn 10.7% less than natives on average. However, the poor explanatory power of this base specification indicates that the impact of important dimensions might have been unaccounted for. Indeed, once we control for observable individual characteristics through sex, age, age-squared, number of employed weeks in the year and number of jobs per year as well as for unobservable individual fixed effects through lagged log real earnings and lagged number of employed weeks, the earnings gap estimate narrows down substantially. Column 2 shows that the earnings gap is now positive and significant. This estimate suggests that immigrants earn 2.3% more than natives on average. The explanatory power of this specification is now high, confirming the importance of controlling for individual characteristics. Indeed, individual heterogeneity is the major determinant of the gap, as we had already controlled for immigrants clustering in specific areas in our base specification. This is a key finding, as the majority of previous studies have not controlled for individual characteristics to the extent that we have, mainly because of data limitations.
The estimates of all other controls are significant and robust here as well as in the remaining models in the article. Women earn 13.5% less than men on average. An extra year of experience (proxied by age) in the labour market increases earnings by 1.8% on average (we interpret the estimate of the squared term as zero, though it is a significant À0.00023, which confirms the usual inverted U-shape relation between age and earnings found in the literature; this small estimate needs to be interpreted in light of the fact that our sample does not include retirement-age individuals, for whom earnings decline faster). An extra week employed in the year increases earnings by 3.2% on average. Holding a second job has a very marginal effect, increasing earnings by 0.1% on average. Increasing past earnings has a positive effect on current earnings: a 1% increase in earnings the year before increases current earnings by 0.726%.
The estimate of the lagged number of employed weeks is negative. The corresponding past employment (lagged hours worked per week) estimate in Chiswick et al. (2005) is also negative. This variable is capturing the effect on earnings of unobserved individualspecific characteristics and circumstances, such as motivation, race and ability, via associated dimensions of the labour contract, such as part-time or full-time work, highor low-turnover jobs and overtime work, that in turn reflect labour market conditions, including labour competition, discrimination, market imperfect information, labour force composition, productivity shocks, demand and supply shocks. The wide range of omitted (unobserved) time invariant characteristics and circumstances at the individual level captured by this variable exert different and opposite effects on earnings and that is why this variable cannot be interpreted directly 11 -in the same way that the estimate of other fixed effect dummies also cannot be interpreted directly (Section 3). (Note that this variable is negative and significant across all percentiles in Table 3 , rising monotonically, confirming that it is systematically capturing unobserved individual fixed effects across the earnings distribution, which is reassuring).
Our main result here is that immigrants do not suffer an earnings penalty and are successfully assimilated into the UK labour market between 1981 and 2006. Our preferred estimate suggests that immigrants earn 2.3% more than natives on average. This suggests that the labour market primarily rewards (observable and unobservable) The sample data used include males aged 25-64 and females aged 25-59 years earning between £100 and £1,000,000 in any one tax year who are observed at least twice with non-missing address (it excludes the self-employed). It includes immigrants arriving from 1945 onwards. See text for details. All models include area fixed effects (49 county dummies) and time fixed effects (29 tax year dummies) and their interaction. Only the model in the right-most columns in bold control for individual fixed effects via lagged log real earnings and lagged number of employed weeks. See text for details. All models are corrected for intragroup correlation, as standard errors are assumed independent across groups of individuals but not within groups (i.e. errors are not assumed independent for a particular individual over time). See text for details. Level of significance: *p50.10, **p50.05, ***p50.01.
11 More technically, the associated À0.22 estimate cannot be directly interpreted as the effect of an extra lagged employed week on earnings, as an extra lagged employed week also increases lagged real earnings, whose estimate is 0.726. Thus, the effect of an extra lagged employed week on earnings will be in fact À2.2% plus a positive fraction of 7.26% (which depends on a model of lagged log real earnings as a function of the lagged number of employed weeks). (Note that the raw correlation between log real earnings and both current and lagged number of employed weeks is positive.) However, as discussed earlier, we can interpret the effect of lagged log real earnings directly on current earnings. Notes as in Table 2 .
Immigrants' assimilation into recipient labour markets . 561
individual characteristics other than immigration status. This, in turn, facilitates the assimilation of immigrants into the UK labour market. The average immigrant-native earnings gap estimate might, however, conceal distinctive patterns of immigrants' assimilation across the earnings distribution. There is, for example, wide consensus that unskilled immigrants do not compete with skilled natives and that any detrimental effect on wages is likely to be at the lowest tier of the distribution (Dustmann et al., 2008 (Dustmann et al., , 2013 Gagliardi, 2014) . To account for this, we reestimate our model using quantile regression estimation. This way we uncover potentially larger or smaller earnings gaps along the distribution that might have been concealed by the average gap. This is a particularly appealing approach where immigrants concentrate at the bottom and top of the earnings distribution, as is the case for the UK over our sample period (Section 2). Estimating the earnings gap in such a flexible yet robust manner across the earnings distribution is an improvement on the existing UK earnings gap literature, where only estimates of the average gap are available. Figure 3 and Table 3 show that the immigrant-native earnings gap narrows down substantially in our preferred specification, as before. It is non-negative, except for those below the 30th percentile, and it increases monotonically across the distribution. The gap is, respectively, À0.016, 0.002, 0.012, 0.033 and 0.089 for the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th and 90th percentiles. That is, among the 10% worst paid workers, immigrants earn 1.6% less than natives; whereas among the 10% best paid workers, immigrants earn 8.9% more. Given that immigration to the UK has been of predominantly unskilled or highly skilled labour, it is unsurprising that the gap is larger at the bottom and top of the distribution. Thus, on the one hand, the lowest paid immigrants suffer an earnings penalty in relation to the lowest paid natives with comparable individual characteristics. This suggests that, for this group, assimilation has been slower. On the other hand, other immigrants do not seem to suffer an earnings penalty and seem to have been well assimilated into the labour market-the gap is fairly small in the middle of the distribution and is in favour of higher-paid immigrants at the top.
According to standard human capital theory, non-negligible gap estimates could be due to unaccounted for productivity differentials. Our model is quite comprehensive. For example, it seems to have captured most such productivity differentials in the middle of the distribution, where the gap is fairly small. argue that the immigrants' skill distribution resembles that of natives, which suggests that such productivity differentials might not be very large in the UK. Nonetheless, our models might not have fully captured productivity differentials for some groups of workers, for example, those at the top and bottom of the distribution. In addition to supply side productivity differentials, possible demand side explanations are that nonnegligible gap estimates are due to imperfect information, friction, discrimination or market power of individual firms, again, perhaps not fully captured in our models.
In sum, our main result here is that the immigrant-native earnings gap in the UK between 1981 and 2006 varies substantially across the earnings distribution, increasing monotonically, and this variability is concealed when solely the average gap is considered. Nevertheless, the gap is still relatively small, at most AE 3.5% for almost the entire distribution (except at the very top). Although no estimates of the gap across the distribution for the UK are available, our results are in line with the international literature, which shows that the immigrant-native earnings gap is also more favourable higher up the distribution for the USA (Butcher and DiNardo, 2002; Chiswick et al., 2008) .
Excluding London
It is customary in the UK literature, especially the strands concerned with introducing more geography into the economic analysis, to perform robustness checks, excluding London from the model Gagliardi, 2014) . This is because, as discussed in Section 2, immigrants display a significant degree of geographic concentration, heavily clustering in London (Table 1) . London is atypical, as it attracts large shares of both highly-skilled and unskilled immigrants, and whether the immigrant-native earnings gap is larger or smaller in London than in the rest of the country is an empirical matter that hinges (i) on the relative magnitudes of such shares in and outside London and (ii) on their associated level of earnings in and outside London. Table 4 shows that the pattern of estimates' significance and magnitude across percentiles is the same whether London is excluded or not (compare with Table 3 ). As expected, for the lowest paid, the gap is now smaller (in absolute terms), less adverse. Put differently, the lowest-paid immigrants outside London still earn less than their native counterparts, but not by quite so much. This means that the lowest-paid immigrants outside London are better off, possibly because ethnic minorities, for whom the gap is often less favourable (Sections 4.4 and 4.5), are overrepresented in London (Nathan, 2014) ; and possibly because competition from newly arrived immigrants, who often enter the labour market as low-paid workers (Section 2), is more fierce in London.
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Conversely, for the highest paid, the immigrant-native earnings gap is larger, more favourable, when excluding London. Put differently, the highest-paid immigrants outside London now earn even more than their native counterparts (compare Tables 3  and 4 ). This means that the highest-paid immigrants outside London are again better off, possibly because the highest-paid natives in London are more educated than in the rest of the UK and command a higher skill premium, which shrinks the gap.
Our main result from before is thus maintained: the immigrant-native earnings gap in the UK between 1981 and 2006 again varies substantially across the earnings distribution, increasing monotonically, when excluding London. Although, again, no comparable estimates are available in existing studies, our results relate to a growing literature documenting lower wage inequality in large urban areas (Black et al., 2009; Lee, 2010; Moretti, 2013) .
The role of 'diversity'
Diversity, defined in terms of nationality or ethnic group, is an important source of heterogeneity when studying immigrants' assimilation, as discussed in the Introduction. Starting with the work of Chiswick (1978 Chiswick ( , 1980 and Borjas (1985) , through to the work of Ottaviano and Peri (2006) , and beyond, ethnicity has been shown to be a significant dimension of immigrants' assimilation. More recently, Rodriguez Pose and von Berlepsch (2014) showed that nationality also drives immigrants' degree of assimilation, and, in turn, their contribution to economic development.
Our sample of immigrants is characterised by substantial heterogeneity in terms of continent of nationality (i.e. the continent where the country of nationality is located), allowing us to exploit the role of this dimension when estimating the immigrant-native earnings gap. Although we implicitly account for continent of nationality to some extent when we control for unobserved individual characteristics in Section 4, we now re-estimate our model including an explicit indicator for continent of nationality as a proxy for such 'group' individual characteristics. Producing estimates by continent of nationality is, of course, informative in itself, as recognised in the existing UK and international literature (Chiswick, 1980; Borjas, 1994; Butcher and DiNardo, 2002; . It is also a way of gaining further insight into the immigrant-native earnings gap. As discussed in Section 2, the various immigration waves to the UK between 1981 and 2006 happened in such a manner that it is possible that immigrants from particular nationalities broadly cluster in specific segments of the earnings distribution. Estimating the earnings gap in such a flexible yet robust manner across continents of nationality is a contribution to the existing UK earnings gap literature, where only estimates by race and ethnicity are available. Figure 4 and Table 5 show the immigrant-native earnings gap for our base (left panel) and preferred (right panel) specifications. The gap is positive and significant for most nationalities, although it is insignificant for immigrants from Africa, Central and South America and negative (À1.5%) for immigrants from Asia and the Middle East. In contrast, the gap is 2.4% for immigrants from the A10. The gap then ranges from 3.4% for immigrants from the EU to 11.8% for immigrants from North America.
Non-negative earnings gap estimates for most continents of nationality suggest that, on the whole, immigrants do not suffer an earnings penalty and are well assimilated into the UK labour market. Furthermore, the gap estimates vary across continents of nationality, and this suggests that some nationalities, such as North Americans, fare better in the labour market. Our analysis suggests that continent of nationality is a significant source of heterogeneity in explaining the earnings gap.
Our results are in line with previous research, which reports a gap estimate for nonwhites between À40 and À10% (Chiswick, 1980; Bell, 1997; . In fact, our base specification, which is closer in nature to those in this previous research, yields estimates between À26.3 and À19.1% for Africa, Asia and the Middle East and Central and South America. This range narrows down substantially in our preferred specification: À1.5 to 0%.
We can also compare continent of nationality estimates with estimates across the earnings distribution. For example, immigrants from Africa, Asia and the Middle East and Central and South America (gap between À1.5 and 0%) are overrepresented at the bottom of the distribution (gap between À3.4 and À0.3%). In contrast, immigrants from North America, Europe and EU and Australasia and Oceania (gap between 2.4 and 11.8%) are overrepresented at the top of the distribution (gap between 3.3 and 8.9%). This confirms that nationalities tend to cluster in segments of the distribution (Section 2).
Our main result here is that the immigrant-native earnings gap in the UK between 1981 and 2006 varies across continents of nationality. Immigrants from Africa, Asia and the Middle East and Central and South America, in the main, do not seem to suffer much of an earnings penalty in the labour market as a result of their immigrant status. This suggests that this group is assimilated into the labour market. In contrast, immigrants from North America, Europe and EU and Australasia and Oceania experience a favourable gap, again suggesting that this group is assimilated-with perhaps a more auspicious assimilation experience. It is, however, worth noting the literature that suggests very different fortunes for immigrants in the UK coming from different parts within a continent. This suggests that assimilation varies within as well as across continents of nationality, and so the results here should be viewed with caution. For example, find that Indians, Afro-Asians and Chinese have higher employment probabilities once in the UK than Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Bell (1997) shows that entry wages in the UK are higher for Indians than for West Indians; while Shields and Wheatley Price (2002) suggest that AfricanAsians perform better in the UK labour market than Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.
Heterogeneity across cohorts of arrival
Cohort of arrival is also an important source of heterogeneity when studying immigrants' assimilation, as discussed in the Introduction. Starting with the work of pioneers such as Chiswick (1978 Chiswick ( , 1980 and Borjas (1985) , immigrants' time of entry into the host country has been shown to be a significant dimension of immigrants' assimilation. Immigrants entering the labour market at different time points fare differently because of changing economic conditions, changing local attitudes towards immigration and changing cohort-specific immigrants' characteristics. We largely Notes as in Table 2. account for local and national macroeconomic conditions in the UK affecting earnings, and to some extent, for changes in attitudes to immigration, when we control for area and time fixed effects and their interaction. However, it is still possible that the earnings gap estimates are affected by immigrants' characteristics specific to their cohort of arrival. We thus exploit the long sample period in our data and re-estimate our model including an explicit indicator for 13 five-year cohorts of arrival as a proxy for such 'cohort' individual characteristics. This way, we account for distinctive features that vary across cohorts such as unmeasured dimensions of immigrants' skills or return migration of immigrants that are more or less able. This also allows us to account to some extent for changes in attitudes towards immigration over time, which might affect immigrants' geographical distribution. Finally, this allows us to account for the nationality composition of each cohort, which might be a driving factor affecting immigrants' geographical distribution across local labour markets. Estimating the earnings gap in such a flexible yet robust manner across 13 cohorts of arrival is a contribution to the existing UK earnings gap literature, where such estimates are as yet unavailable. Producing estimates by cohort of arrival is, of course, informative in itself, as widely recognised in the literature (Borjas, 1985; Bell, 1997; Borjas, 1999) . It is also a way to gain further insight into the immigrant-native earnings gap. As discussed in Section 2, the various immigration waves to the UK between 1981 and 2006 happened in such a manner that it is possible to associate immigrants from particular nationalities with particular cohorts. Figure 5 and Table 6 show the immigrant-native earnings gap for our base (left panel) and preferred (right panel) specifications. The gap is positive and significant for Percent 1990 1985 -1989 1975 -1979 1980 -1984 Pooled 1995 -1999 2000 -2004 1955 -1959 1950 -1954 1960 -1964 1945 -1949 1970 -1974 1965 -1969 Cohort of Arrival .4
.5 1990 1985 -1989 1975 -1979 1980 -1984 Pooled 1995 -1999 2000 -2004 1955 -1959 1950 -1954 1960 -1964 1945 -1949 1970 -1974 1965 -1969 Cohort most cohorts, although it is insignificant for immigrants arriving in 1985-1989 and slightly negative for immigrants arriving in 1990-1994. Interestingly, these are cohorts that witnessed greater immigration of lower-paid EU workers, following the accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain. In contrast, the gap is between 2.5 and 3.6% for immigrants arriving in 1995-2004. These cohorts received a mix of A10 workers, higher-paid workers from the EU and North America and lower-paid workers from Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The gap is between 3.8 and 6.1% in the 1950s and 1960s, when workers mainly came from Ireland and former colonies. A number of distinctive features of these immigrant inflows, such as knowledge of the English language and British work ethics, may contribute to explaining their faster assimilation. In addition, immigration in the post-war period, aimed at the reconstruction effort, might have attracted a more positive attitude towards immigrants in recipient labour markets.
Percent
12 Notes as in Table 2 .
12 The gap estimate is a large 0.142 for the 2005 cohort, which should be viewed with caution. This cohort is 4 years short and has only one observation per individual (after calculating lagged log real earnings).
An attempt to compare cohort of arrival estimates with our earlier continent of nationality estimates indicates that, broadly speaking, cohorts with a greater share of immigrants from North America, Europe and EU and Australasia and Oceania performed better. However, although this comparison is a worthwhile exercise for very broad patterns, it is only suggestive evidence, because in the majority of cases each cohort is characterised by a mix of immigrants from several continents of nationality. The analysis is further confounded when we differentiate between lower-paid and higher-paid immigrants, which might also affect the direction and magnitude of the gap.
Non-negative earnings gap estimates for most cohorts of arrival suggest that, on the whole, immigrants do not suffer an earnings penalty and are well assimilated into the UK labour market. Furthermore, the gap estimates vary across cohorts of arrival, and this suggests that immigrants arriving in particular cohorts, such as during the post-war period, fare better in the labour market. Our analysis suggests that cohort of arrival is a significant source of heterogeneity in explaining the earnings gap.
Although no directly comparable estimates of the immigrant-native earnings gap across cohorts of arrival are available for the UK (Bell, 1997 offers cohort estimates by ethnicity using a different model specification), our results are broadly in line with the international literature (Borjas, 1999) .
Area fixed effects
We modelled area fixed effects above using counties as geographical units to proxy local labour markets. We now address two concerns about the choice of such geographical units, which, in turn, enable us to purposely exploit the geography of the UK to further check the robustness of our results. First, the UK geography over the period we study is not straighforward. Even when we use administrative geographies, such as counties, instead of more dynamic geographies (Appendix), we run into difficulties. This is largely because local government in the UK has been the subject of a constant restructuring process. As we discuss in detail in the Appendix, different definitions of counties are used in the UK literature. We summarise such main definitions in Table A1 . As our sample period spans the 1980s through to the 2000s, we are restricted to using the definition before the Local Government Reorganization (pre-LGR) (Table A1 and Appendix), which amounts to 66 counties for Great Britain (as opposed to the 49 counties for the UK we used earlier in the text). Table 7 shows that our results are remarkably robust to this alternative definition, despite a smaller sample that now excludes Northern Ireland (Appendix). Our immigrant-native earnings gap estimate remains unchanged at 2.3%.
Secondly, ideally, geographical units should conform to the actual radius of local labour markets, where both natives and immigrants compete for work. The boundaries of the actual radius of such local labour markets are unlikely to coincide with counties. As our data allow us to choose alternative geographical units, we experiment with three of them: counties, LAs and TTWAs (Table A1 ). Counties and LAs are first-and second-tier administrative geographies, respectively, and TTWAs are local labour market functional geographies (Appendix). Table A1 shows that there are 408 LAs, as well as 232 TTWAs in the 2001 definition and 297 TTWAs in the 1991 definition in Great Britain (as opposed to the 49 counties for the UK we used in the main analysis) (Appendix). We already showed earlier that our results are robust to two alternative definitions of counties. Table 7 now also shows that our results are again remarkably robust to using LAs and TTWAs, despite a smaller sample that again excludes Northern Ireland. Our immigrant-native earnings gap estimates change only very marginally, now ranging between 2.1 and 2.2%.
The earnings gap over time
We have so far discussed assimilation as a snapshot for the whole sample period, pulling together immigrants that have been in the UK for different lengths of time (Table 1) . We now look at different immigrant profiles to build a picture of different assimilation trajectories over time across continents of nationality (i.e. the continent where the country of nationality is located) and cohorts of arrival. To do this, we re-estimate our model with two alterations. First, we include an extra term, X iat I i , in the model. By interacting each control in X iat with our immigrant indicator I i (Section 3), we allow the effect of each control to differ across natives and immigrants. Secondly, we include the variable 'years since immigration', and its squared value, as an additional control in the model to account for the effect of time spent in the UK on earnings. As we already control for experience, via age, and since 'years since immigration' is often identical to experience in the UK, this enables us to gauge the weight that employers attach to experience gained in the UK. The resulting is a standard model in the literature used to estimate the immigrant-earnings gap at entry and over time (Chiswick, 1980; Bell, 1997; Borjas, 1999; Lubotsky, 2007) . Table 8 (see also its counterpart Table A2 ) shows significant immigrant-native earnings gap estimates at entry and over time. The first column in Table 8 shows that immigrants, on average, earn 51.5% less than comparable natives at the point of entry in the UK. The gap estimates narrow to À2% after 1 year and À0.7% after 2 years in the UK. It is then 9.8% after 10 years and 22% after 20 years. This suggests that immigrants' earnings catch up with natives' earnings in a little over 2 years. 1945-1949 arrivals À0.181 1950-1954 arrivals À0.296 1955-1959 arrivals À0.333 1960-1964 arrivals À0.315 1965-1969 arrivals À0.302 1970-1974 arrivals À0.326 1975-1979 arrivals À0.395 1980-1984 arrivals À0.415 1985-1989 arrivals À0.466 1990-1994 arrivals À0.514 1995-1999 Estimates derived from coefficients in Table A2 .
There is, however, considerable variability among continents of nationality. The second column in Table 8 shows that the earnings gap estimate for Asians and Middle Easterners goes from À61.2% at entry, to À24.2% after 1 year, À11.1% after 10 years and 2% after 20 years. In contrast, the earnings gap for North Americans goes from À37.3% at entry, to 23.8% after 1 year, 36.9% after 10 years and 50% after 20 years. This suggests that North Americans not only have a smaller negative gap at entry but also a faster catch up rate over time. While Asians and Middle Easterners' earnings took almost 20 years to catch up with natives' earnings, North Americans' earnings substantially surpassed natives' earnings in less than a year. More generally, column 2 in Table 8 shows that the earnings gap estimates are less negative for North Americans, Europeans and Australians at entry and that their earnings catch up faster with natives' earnings. Bell (1997) estimated a comparable model using GHS data for the 1970s and 1980s, and also found that the gap at entry, and the subsequent catch-up, is more negative for Asians (Indians) than for Europeans. estimated a simpler model using LFS data for the 1980s through to the 2000s and also found that the gap was more negative for Asians and Africans than for Europeans.
There is also considerable variability among cohorts of arrival. The third column in Table 8 shows that the earnings gap estimate for those arriving in the 1945-1949 post-war period, goes from À18.1% at entry, to 54.5% after 1 year, 68.6% after 10 years and 85.6% after 20 years. In contrast, the earnings gap for those arriving most recently, in 2000-2004, goes from À53.9% at entry, to À2.8% after 1 year, 11.2% after 10 years and 28.3% after 20 years. This suggests that those arriving in the post-war period not only have a smaller negative gap at entry, but also a faster catch up rate over time. While the earnings of those arriving most recently took a little over 2 years to catch up with natives' earnings, the earnings of those arriving in the post-war period greatly surpassed natives' earnings in less than a year. More generally, column 3 in Table 8 shows that the earnings gap estimates are less negative for earlier cohorts of arrival. For example, immigrants who arrived in the 1940s and 1950s earned approximately 20-30% less than comparable natives at entry, on average; whereas immigrants who arrived in the 1990s and early 2000s earned approximately 50% less than comparable natives at entry on average. Bell (1997) also found successively larger cohort estimates for some groups of immigrants but not for others.
Our estimates contrast with entry earnings gap estimates between À15 and À35% and with slower catch up rates for the USA in a roughly comparable model, which, however, does not control for country of nationality (Borjas, 1999) . There are many reasons why our estimates are larger, including differences in the labour market and in the immigrant population composition, as well as differences in model specification, data type and sample period. The US model uses the wage rate, instead of annual earnings (Section 2), different controls and data from the 1970, 1980 and 1990 Census. Other obvious differences include the fact that the USA has had substantial low-skilled immigration, whereas the UK has had comparatively larger highly-skilled immigration (Borjas, 1994) . In addition, perhaps because the US labour market is more flexible, low-paid immigrants in the UK have a more negative earnings gap at entry and thus have faster earnings growth (Chiswick et al., 2008) . Furthermore, such low-paid workers in the UK might be more skilled, and hence might overcome the usual earnings and occupation downgrading they suffer at entry more quickly (Friedberg, 2001; Manacorda et al., 2007) .
Our main conclusions are that North Americans, Europeans and Australians fare better at entry and their earnings catch up faster with natives' earnings. Similarly, earlier cohorts fare better than more recent ones at entry, and the earnings of immigrants from such cohorts catch up faster with natives' earnings. These examples of trajectories of immigrant-native earnings gap over time across continents of nationality and cohorts of arrival illustrate how the pooled estimates mix together very diverse groups of immigrants who differ widely in a range of individual characteristics (such as English proficiency, work ethics, skills transferability and motivation). This is in line with our earlier results and completes the picture of our earlier analysis.
Conclusions
This article investigates the degree to which immigrants have been able to assimilate into UK recipient labour markets by estimating the immigrant-native earnings gap across the earnings distribution, across continents of nationality and across cohorts of arrival between 1981 and 2006. By using a rich, underexploited, sizeable and long longitudinal data set that has rarely been used for immigration analysis, we track a large sample of immigrants over 25 years. We are able to control for observable and unobservable individual-specific characteristics as well as for specific characteristics of both time periods and recipient labour markets, defined as small geographical areas, and, crucially, for the interaction of the two, in a robust empirical model specification. We also control for cohort-specific effects and nationality-specific effects. This way, we separately control for the role of each of these dimensions on immigrants' assimilation. The individual characteristics dimension seems to be preponderant in explaining most of the gap.
This article is an important contribution, as previous studies have not, possibly because of data limitations, estimated the immigrant-native earnings gap using such a robust empirical specification, tracking such a large sample of individuals and defining recipient labour markets as small geographical areas consistently over such a long period.
Our results show little evidence of large or persistent earnings disparities across the earnings distribution, across cohorts or across nationalities. These findings are supportive evidence of successful assimilation of immigrants into the UK. Recipient labour markets primarily reward individuals' characteristics other than, and regardless of, their immigration status. This, in turn, facilitates assimilation. Nevertheless, some distinctive features emerge. Immigrants entering the labour market at the bottom of the earnings distribution tend to have a less favourable assimilation experience. Also, immigrants entering the UK in the post-war period experienced faster assimilation, suggesting, possibly, a more positive attitude towards immigration associated with the role of immigrants in the post-war reconstruction effort. Earlier cohorts, such as the post-war cohorts, not only fare better than more recent ones at entry but also the earnings of immigrants in such cohorts catch up faster with natives' earnings. Similarly, North Americans, Europeans and Australians fare better at entry and their earnings catch up faster with natives' earnings. More generally, investigating the evolution of the immigrant-native earnings gap over time reveals how immigrants from different continents of nationality and cohorts of arrival have different assimilation trajectories.
The emergence of these distinctive features highlights that assimilation effects-and immigration effects more generally-feed through complex channels in the economy that include factor equalisation as well as industry structure and output mix adjustments. In other words, assimilation effects depend on how native workers respond to competition from immigrants, the degree of substitution or complementarity between immigrant and native labour and how firms alter their production function and production mix in response to immigration-led labour supply shifts. These, in turn, affect productivity, wages, employment and growth in recipient labour markets. Needless to say, these have been, and continue to be, fruitful avenues for future research.
East of England, West Midlands, East Midlands, North West, North East, Yorkshire and the Humber, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The last three are not technically GORs, but they are often reported alongside GORs (ONS, 1999) . Because sample size limitations in commonly used UK data sets prevent levels of disaggregation below GORs (see Section 1), most of the UK immigration literature uses this geography. As our data allow us to choose alternative geographical units, we experiment with three of them: counties, LAs and TTWAs. Counties and LAs are first-and second-tier administrative geographies and TTWAs are local labour market functional geographies. Table A1 . TTWAs based on commuting data that cover 100% sample of those in work
Although our data record postcode and LA for those in England, Wales and Scotland, they do not record any information on address other than country for those in Northern Ireland. As a result, except for the definition county-GOR above, we are unable to use data for the whole of the United UK (United Kingdom) and instead use data for GB (Great Britain) only (excluding Northern Ireland).
county-region-DCA definitions, 13 and found remarkably robust results (Table 7 and Section 4.4).
A.1.3. Local authorities
The aforementioned definitions mix first-and second-tier geographical units. An alternative is to use single-tier geographical units, such as LADs, created in England between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s (DCLG, 2010) . LAs are defined to include LADs and UAs (DEFRA, 2005) . We combine LAs with the single-tier CAs and DCAs, discussed earlier, to obtain the 354-22-32-26 LAD-UA-CA-DCA definition (Table A1 ). This definition counters some of the aforementioned criticisms, as now all areas of the UK are more evenly split, both in terms of population size and in terms of territory size. This allows us to treat each unit as a small local labour market, eliminating the disparity of modelling the whole of London as one single labour market, for example. We checked the robustness of our results by modelling area fixed effects using this definition and found remarkably robust results (Table 7 and Section 4.4).
A.2. Functional geographies

A.2.1. Local labour markets
The official definition of local labour markets in the UK is Travel To Work Areas (TTWAs). TTWAs are defined to encompass both the homes and workplaces of most workers. That is, TTWAs are defined so that most commuting flow is contained within their boundaries. TTWAs were introduced in the 1960s but are reviewed with each new Census to account for changes in the dynamic patterns of commuting, due, for example, to improvements in transport infrastructure and individual's preferences reflecting trends and shifts in the geographical space (Coombes and Bond, 2008) . As a result, TTWAs are ever-changing geographical units, which are regularly updated with dramatic boundary discontinuities (Table A1) . Because of this, it is conceptually misleading to use TTWAs over a long period, such as the one in our analysis, as we would be implicitly assuming that dynamic labour markets are unchanging. Furthermore, ongoing changes in their definition criteria 14 make TTWAs noncomparable over time (Coombes and Bond, 2008) .
Bearing in mind these caveats, we checked the robustness of our results by modelling area fixed effects using both the 2001 and 1991 TTWA definitions, formed, respectively, of 243 and 308 geographical units (see footnote 13)-the postcode-TTWAs mapping for the 1981 definition proved impossible to obtain. 15 The idea, as some argue, is that the underlying labour market economic activity in, say, the 2001 TTWAs is an enduring geographical reality that existed before the 2001 Census Day and outlives changes in the definition criteria. Put differently, the 2001 TTWAs were an aspect of the labour economic activity back in the 1980s and 1990s, though they might have been defined then as, say, cities or regions, and the intensity and dynamics of labour market activities then might have been different (Coombes, 2010) . By using both the 1991 and 2001 TTWAs definitions, each in turn, we allow for two different 'weighing systems' in the intensity and dynamics of such labour market activities, and test whether our results are robust to this. Indeed, we found remarkably robust results (Table 7 and Section 4.4).
